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A MODEL JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 
<Jerald <Junther* 
JUDGMENT IN JERUSALEM: C:mEF JUSTICE SIMON AGRANAT AND 
THE ZIONIST CENTURY. By Pnina Lahav. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 1997. Pp. xvii, 314. $29.95. 
I have long been a fan of the Michigan Law Review's annual 
book review issue. I was therefore particularly delighted to read 
the Introduction to last year's issue, the twentieth anniversary of 
this ingenious and, I think, unique law review format. Michigan 
professor Carl Schneider wrote that opening piece.1 Schneider 
brought excellent credentials to the writing of his witty and 
thoughtful essay: he was Editor-in-Chief of the Law Review twenty 
years ago, and thus present at the creation of the book review issue. 
His thoughtful Introduction states, accurately I believe, that the 
book review issue "is the best read issue of any law review in the 
country."2 He recalls the initial goals of the format and offers per­
suasive suggestions for future ones. He points out that one of the 
purposes of the book review issue is to "serV'e the readers," stating: 
"[B]ecause there is now so much published, no one can read every­
thing; and because much of it is not good, no one would want to. 
Book reviews, then, help their readers decide which books to buy, 
which to read, and which to study."3 I agree with his observation, 
as I especially do with his comment that "often a serious book goes 
unreviewed for several years because it was overlooked in the 
flood" of new books.4 The inattention to Pnina Lahav's5 biography 
of Simon Agranat in this country vividly illustrates Schneider's 
remark about books that have been overlooked. 
The silence of American newspapers and periodicals has been 
stunning. The New York Review of Books, The New York Times, 
other major newspapers and magazines of general circulation -
none have reviewed the book.6 Attention to the book in American 
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law Emeritus, Stanford University. A.B. 1949, 
Brooklyn; M.A. 1950, Columbia; LL.B. 1953, Harvard. - Ed. 
1. Carl E. Schneider, The Book Review Issue: An Owner's Guide, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1363 
(1998). 
2. Id. at 1375. 
3. Id. at 1368. 
4. Id. at 1373. 
5. Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. 
6. The only serious press evaluations of the book I have found are in foreign newspapers: 
e.g., enthusiastic reviews in Israel's English language daily, the Jerusalem Post, and one in 
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publications consists only of a favorable review by Sanford 
Levinson in the History Book Club Review7 and an extensive, 
enthusiastic evaluation by Laura Kalman, a knowledgeable and 
thoughtful biographer herself,8 in Law and Social Inquiry, the Jour­
nal of the American Bar Foundation.9 Kalman, who had written a 
blurb for Judgment in Jerusalem - a blurb beginning "[t]his is the 
best biography I have ever read" - superbly surveys the pitfalls 
that confront a biographer and evaluates Lahav's achievement far 
more thoroughly than I can here. She ends her forty-five-page 
essay with the statement: "I wish my blurb had been more 
glowing."10 
I fully share Kalman's enthusiasm. I, too, am convinced that 
Pnina Lahav has written a truly superb book. Her biography of 
Simon Agranat tells an enormously gripping story of one human 
being's life and, at least as important (but rare), depicts her subject 
with continuous attention to the context of the rich history that 
affected him and that he affected. As a result, this is not only a 
portrait of an intriguing individual but also a sophisticated, nuanced 
depiction of the strains and divisions that have marked the history 
of Zionism, of Israel, and of Israeli law. Moreover, the book is a 
great read. 
I suspect that most readers of this book review issue have never 
heard of Simon Agranat and are neither Zionists nor especially 
interested in the history of Israel. This review is an effort to per­
suade you not to let these considerations stand as obstacles to your 
decision to read this book. I speak from personal experience; I, too, 
had not heard of Agranat and was not steeped in Israeli history. 
My major field is American constitutional law, not comparative 
constitutional law. I am a Jew, a refugee from Nazi Germany in the 
late 1930s. The German Jewish culture of my youth left me no leg­
acy that would turn me into a devoted Zionist. My acquaintance 
with Israel is less than a decade old - only two visits, one to attend 
a conference,11 the other to give a lecture12 - after years of travel 
to many other foreign countries. Yet I was overwhelmed by 
German in the Frankfurter Allgemeine. See Allen E. Shapiro, Jewish Justice in the Promised 
Land, JERUSALEM PoST, Dec. 4, 1997, at 9, and FRANKFURTER ALl.GEMEINE ZEITUNG, Mar. 
20, 1998, at 11. 
7. See Sanford Levinson, HISTORY BooK CLUB REVIEW (June 1998). 
8. LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY (1990). 
9. See Laura Kahpan, The Power of Biography, 23 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 479 (1998). 
10. Id. at 524. 
11. International Conference, The Nature and Legitimacy of Judicial Review, The 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, December, 1994. 
12. Gerald Gunther, The Art and Craft of Judging in the United States: Reflections of 
Judge Learned Hand's Biographer (Louis D. Brandeis Memorial Lecture, Israel Academy of 
Sciences and Humanities, Jerusalem) (Jan. 14, 1997). 
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Lahav's riveting book. My enthusiasm stems mainly from the fact 
that I am an aficionado of biographies, including but not limited to 
judicial biographies. , In view of my very limited familiarity with 
Agranat and with Israel, I was stunned by my immediate absorption 
in Lahav's book. 
This review, then, is an effort to bring to the attention of the 
readers of this year's book review issue a truly worthy and capti­
vating book that richly illuminates many issues of considerable 
interest to American readers. This effort to shine a spotlight on an 
egregiously neglected book was spurred by a phone call from an 
editor on the Michigan Law Review asking me to review any or all 
of the biographies of American judges published recently. I replied 
that I was familiar with all the biographies, for I had read them in 
the course of serving as chair of the Supreme Court Historical 
Society's Committee on the Griswold Prize, an award for the best 
book relating to the Supreme Court.13 Reluctant to review books 
that I had already discussed at length with my committee col­
leagues, I suggested to the editor that I instead review the Agranat 
biography that I had just begun to read, for I was finding it to be the 
best I had encountered in a very long time. The editor, understand­
ably, had never heard of Agranat or indeed the author; but, per­
haps inspired by Carl Schneider's introductory essay last year, 
agreed to discuss it with his co-editors, who ultimately approved my 
suggestion. 
I am writing this review because I remain convinced, after two 
readings, that Judgment in Jerusalem is indeed a remarkable 
achievement. My fervor is not diminished by another emotion that 
surfaced intermittently as I immersed myself in it. I had worked for 
many years on a biography of Learned Hand,14 in which I sought to 
interweave my subject's personal makeup, historical context, and 
public work, and to present my story in as readable a manner as I 
could. I am proud of my book, but I must acknowledge that 
Lahav's book, written with dazzling fluency and grace, nuance and 
thoughtfulness, is to me the model biography. And to fuel my envy 
some more, her book on Agranat is less than half the length of mine 
on Hand! This envy has also driven my interest in writing this 
essay: my Hand biography attracted a great deal of attention in the 
American media; I was truly disturbed that Lahav's book has been 
so widely ignored here and is hence unknown to most legal academ­
ics, to lawyers and students, and to fellow fans of biographies.15 
13. Our committee recommended that the award go to Andrew Kaufman for his fine 
biography of Cardozo: .ANoREw L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO (1998). 
14. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994) [hereinafter 
GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND]. 
15. I fear that I have taken so much space with these personal reflections that I may not 
be able to do justice to the attractions of this book. If my advocacy for this distinguished 
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* * * 
Why then do I find this book so outstanding? In my view, 
superb biographies are often the product of special connections 
between biographer and subject. Lahav and Agranat are an espe­
cially promising match. Her Prologue notes the irony "in the fact 
that Agranat and I have traded places. Born in America to Russian 
immigrant parents, he made his home in Israel. I was born in Tel 
Aviv to parents from Iran and Egypt and m&de my home in the 
United States" (p. xvii). Lahav has special reason to understand 
what it is to be an immigrant, as Agranat was; both became firmly 
rooted in two cultures, Israeli and American. Lahav has been a 
member of the Boston University law faculty for two decades. 
American constitutional law is her specialty, but her early immer­
sion in Israeli life and culture and her continuing interest in Israeli 
events assure a surefooted depiction of the strands and strains in 
Israeli law and politics. Her rootedness in two countries could not 
alone guarantee a book as good as this one, to be sure. It must be 
her remarkable perceptiveness and her gifts for engagingly lucid 
and nuanced prose that were essential to fashioning a book of this 
admirable quality. 
The central theme of Lahav's biography is, of course, the life of 
her subject, Simon Agranat. But in her skillful hands, that life 
becomes a revealing prism through which to portray and evaluate 
the history and culture of the country in which Agranat spent most 
of his life. His life, unlike that of any other Israeli Justice, began in 
the United States. Lahav's skillful portrayal of his American years 
introduces some of the themes that permeate the entire book. Born 
in Louisville in 1906, the young Agranat spent most of his first 
twenty-four years in Chicago. It was in Chicago that he developed 
two pervasive interests: Zionism and the American Progressive 
movement. To resolve any conflict between Agranat's American­
ism and his Zionism, he followed the advice of Louis Brandeis: "To 
be better Americans we must become better Jews, and to be better 
Jews we must become better Zionists" (p. 18). In high school, he 
became Editor-in-Chief of a monthly Zionist magazine. When the 
American Zionist movement split between those who followed 
Louis Brandeis and those who followed Chaim Weizmann, 
Agranat's sympathies clearly lay with Brandeis, but he did not 
openly challenge his Zionist father's clear devotion to Weizmann. 
After a brief, failed migration in 1922 to Israel - then Palestine, a 
British Mandate - Agranat and his family returned to Chicago, 
where he attended the University of Chicago for his undergraduate 
and law degrees. His enthusiasm for the Progressive movement 
biography leaves any reader in doubt, I strongly urge a reading of Kalman's persuasive evalu­
ation, supra note 9. 
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was greater than ever. Robert M. LaFollette, Agranat's hero even 
in high school, gained his support in the 1924 presidential campaign, 
even though Agranat was not yet old enough to vote. After his 
admission to the Illinois Bar in 1930, Agranat left Chicago for New 
York to board a ship for Palestine - his parents had migrated there 
a few months earlier, and Simon followed them. 
As I read Lahav's absorbing account of Agranat's American 
years, I thought· - not for the last time - of similarities between 
Lahav's subject, Simon Agranat, and mine, Learned Hand. 
Agranat's private reservations about his father's strong support of 
Zionism a la Weizmann reminded me not only of Hand's struggle 
for youthful independence from his strong, rigid father but also of 
his reluctance to yield to family pressures that he go to law school 
rather than pursue graduate study in philosophy. An even more 
striking parallel is that Hand, three decades older than Agranat, 
was also an enthusiastic supporter of the Progressive movement. 
Indeed, no political cause stirred Hand as much in his life as Teddy 
Roosevelt's Bull Moose campaign of 1912, the campaign that 
pushed the Progressives into national prominence. Hand was 
already a judge by then, yet he felt so strongly about the cause that 
he served as an adviser to Roosevelt; and a year later, he permitted 
his name to be entered in the 1913 campaign for the Chief Judge­
ship of New York State's highest court in order to further Progres­
sive ideals. The younger Agranat, by contrast, did not have 
occasion to become enchanted by the Progre,ssives until the 1920s, 
when Robert LaFollette was the presidential candidate. Eastern 
Teddy Roosevelt Progressives such as Hand were not enthusiastic 
allies of the Party members from the West, for the Western faithful 
seemed too populist as well as too lacking in the rigor and hard­
headedness that those in the East cherished. At a minimum, then, 
Agranat and Hand, in their affiliations with the Progressive move­
ment, were lawyers whose values and goals extended well beyond 
material gains. 
Agranat's move to Palestine meant· that the young Illinois law­
yer had to engage with a chaotic legal system: Ottoman law- still 
provided a good part of the structure;- British law slowly left its 
imprints; and law books, including reports of judicial decisions, 
were not yet readily available. But Agranat was determined to 
remain, and his perseverance succeeded: after ten years of private 
practice, he was named a magistrate in 1940. By the time the State 
of Israel was formed in 1948 and the new State's judicial posts had 
to be filled, the experienced Agranat was an attractive choice. 
Soon, he was appointed as Chief District Judge for Haifa; six 
months later, in January 1949, he became a Justice of the new na­
tion's Supreme Court. 
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Agranat served as a Justice of the Israel Supreme Court until 
1976; for the last eleven years of this tenure, he was the Chief Jus­
tice. His major opinions bear some resemblance to John Marshall's 
in the early days of American national history, for Agranat too was 
writing on a clean slate and his approach became a keystone in the 
development of Israeli law. Many of his rulings dealt with major 
issues in the growth of the state. I will not try to address most of 
them; Lahav's informative book and Kalman'.s extensive review do 
that job well. 
* * * 
Similarities in the judicial work of Agranat and Hand had par­
ticular resonance for me, in view of my recent work on the Hand 
biography. In her book, Lahav speaks of Agranat's "uncommonly 
long" opinions (p. 69), a trait with which Hand is not readily identi­
fied. But in explaining Agranat's almost obsessive efforts to tackle 
every issue in a case, she offers an explanation that applies equally 
to the modest, self-doubting Hand. She says: "Sensitive to the 
indeterminacy of legal doctrine, to the two sides of each coin, he 
needed to persuade himself that his result was justified. He felt 
compelled to expose the process of legal deliberation in order to 
feel at peace with the result " (p. 69). Moreover, the similarity to 
Hand emerges from the substance of Agranat's analysis in some of 
the cases. 
Nowhere is this parallel clearer than in one of the most influen­
tial and well-known Agranat opinions, Kol Ha-am v. Minister of the 
Interior.16 The Kol Ha-am case involved the Interior Minister's 
temporary ban on the publication of two Communist newspapers. 
The Government's ban was based on· a law enacted during the 
British Mandate period, in 1933, authorizing the Minister to sus­
pend publication "if any matter appearing in a newspaper is, in [his] 
opinion . . .  likely to endanger the public peace. "17 The challenged 
articles were published in March 1953, at the height of the Cold 
War. The stimulus was a later discredited story in a leading Israeli 
newspaper that Israel's Ambassador to Washington, Abba Eban, 
had expressed his country's readiness to provide 200,000 Israeli 
troops in the event of a war between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. The criticism of this report by the Stalinist newspa­
pers asserted, for example, that: 
16. Kol Ha-am v. Minister of Interior, 1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF TIIE SUPREME CouRT 
OF lsRAEL 90 (1953) (English translation of 7 P.D. 871) (hereinafter Kol Ha-am]. Lahav 
discusses the case at pp. 107-12 of her book; see also her earlier, fuller discussion in Pnina 
Lahav, American Influence on Israel's Jurisprudence of Free Speech, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
21, 27-61 (1981). 
17. Kol Ha-am, supra note 16, at 91-92 (quoting newspaper article originally printed in 
KuL HA'AM, 1953). 
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[T]he masses in Israel know that the Soviet Union is faithful to the 
policy of the brotherhood of peoples in peace .. .. If Abba Eban or 
anyone else wan� to go and fight_ on the side of the American war­
mongers, let him go, but go alone. The masses want peace and 
national independence . . . . Let us increase our struggle against the 
anti-national policy of the Ben-Gurion government, which is speculat­
ing on the blood of Israel youth.18 
Agranat's Kol Ha-am ruling held the Minister's ban illegal. 
The episode "that this story brought to mind was of course the 
setting of the Masses case, a very important case decided by then­
District Judge Learned Hand in 1917, 1 9  soon after the outbreak of 
World War I and the enactment of the Espionage Act of 1917. The 
Masses, a pacifist, strongly left-leaning magazine, admired those 
who refused to enlist in the American armed forces or who opposed 
the draft. New York City's Postmaster promptly issued an order 
banning The Masses from the mail,20 and The Masses went to 
Hand's court to seek an injunction against the ban. In 1917, no 
major First Amendment case had ever been before the U.S. 
Supreme Court, so that Hand had $Orne room to consider the issue 
without the confinements of precedents. Hand ruled against the 
Postmaster, thereby risking (and ultimately losing) his possible ele­
vation to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.21 
The factual settings of the Kol Ha-am and Masses cases were 
obviously quite similar . . In each situation, the Government sought 
to suppress publications that criticized its policies. In the United 
States, Congress has passe� a law that, for the first time in more 
than a century, sought fo inhibit speech critical of the government. 
Most of the public, caught up iri patriotism and enthusiastic support 
for the ongoing war, no doubt supported the law. In Israel, a 
British Mandate ordinance, continued by the new State of Israel, 
provided the basis for the press ban. In neither country could the 
court ruling have pleased the general public. Yet the judges struck 
down the prohibitions. 
Hand and Agranat were not crusading judges; indeed, they were 
typically opposed to interventions in policy disputes by overly 
activist judges. Moreover, Hand was by nature filled with self­
doubt and skepticism not only about himself but about exercising 
18. Id. at 93. 
19. Masses Publg. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) revd., 245 F. 102 (2d Cir. 
1917). 
20. Tue Espionage Act declared "unmailable" publications made illegal by the Act. Tue 
New York Postmaster's ban was ordered by the Postmaster General. See Gerald Gunther, 
Learned Hand and the Origins of Modem First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of 
History, 27 STAN. L. REv. 719, 723 (1975); GUNTHER, LEARNED !IAND, supra note 14, at 151-
60. 
21. A unanimous Court of Appeals promptly overturned Hand's ruling. See Masses 
Publg. Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). 
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judicial review as well. He was an early opponent of Lochner v. 
New York22 and the Lochnerizing era to which it gave birth, and 
those abuses of judicial review made him averse to drastic rulings 
for the rest of his life.23 True, Hand was sitting in a country where 
the courts' power to review the constitutionality of executive or leg­
islative action had been clearly established more than a century ear­
lier. Agranat, on the other hand, was adjudicating in a nation 
notoriously beset, then and now, by national security concerns. 
And Israel, unlike the United States, lacked then (and still lacks 
today) a written constitution. Israel's national legislature, the 
Knesset, is theoretically supreme, and Agranat had no ready basis 
to fashion an Israeli counterpart to Marbury v. Madison24 out of the 
clay of parliamentary supremacy. 
Yet both judges handed down rulings of lasting significance to 
freedom of expression and freedom of the press. To me, the most 
striking parallel between Agranat and Hand is the way they 
reached their decisions. Neither Agranat nor Hand purported to be 
handing down a constitutional decision. Instead, each ruling was 
based, on the face of it, on statutory interpretation, the far more 
traditional task of judges. Yet both Agranat and Hand, through 
their apparently modest rulings, contributed greatly to the constitu­
tional development of their nations. 
The analytical methodology of these two judges warrants fuller 
elaboration. Hand's Masses opinion clearly asserts at the outset 
that the constitutionality of the congressional legislation was not at 
issue in this case; only the reach of the statute, the law's "meaning," 
was involved.25 Central to his statutory interpretation was his reli­
ance on the premises of a democratic regime. Thus, he emphasized 
that, normally, disagreement with government policy falls "within 
that right to criticise either by temperate reasoning, or by immoder­
ate and indecent invective, which is normally the privilege of the 
individual in countries dependent upon the free expression of opin­
ion as the ultimate source of authority."26 Later in his opinion he 
- stated that: 
It would contradict the normal assumption of democratic government 
that the suppression of hostile criticism does not tum upon the justice 
of its substance or the decency and propriety of its temper. Assuming 
that the power to repress such opinion may rest in Congress in [war­
time] ... its exercise is so contrary to the use and wont of our people 
22. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
23. See, e.g., LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73-74 (1958). 
24. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
25. 244 F. at 538. 
26. 244 F. at 539. 
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that only the clearest expression of such power justifies the conclusion 
that it was intended.27 
And so he found no such repressive intent here. 
Hand did recognize that there was a limit to critical expressions. 
Advocating an incitement standard, he stated: 
[T]o assimilate agitation, legitimate as such, with direct incitement to 
violent resistance, is to disregard the tolerance of all methods of agita­
tion which in normal times is a safeguard of free government ....  If 
one stops short of urging upon others that it is their duty or their 
interest to resist the law, it seems to me one should not be held to 
have attempted to cause its violation. If that be not the test, I can see 
no escape from the conclusion that under this [law] every political 
agitation which can be shown to be apt to create a seditious temper is 
illegal. I am confident that by such language Congress had no such 
revolutionary purpose in view.2s 
Agranat reached a result vecy similar to Hand's in his Kol 
Ha-am opinion, through a route akin to Hand's.29 Like Hand, he 
articulated the presuppositions of a democratic system and empha­
sized the importance of freedom of expression. But when Hand 
articulated "the normal assumption of democratic government,"30 
he could implicitly rely on the existence of a written constitution, 
with its explicit protection of freedom of speech in its First 
Amendment. Agranat had no such foothold. Instead, he, even 
more daringly and ingeniously, pointed instead to Israel's Declara­
tion of Independence of 1948 and drew from it the values central to 
Israel as a democratic as well as Jewish state. Prior to Agranat's 
ruling, the Israeli Supreme Court had refused to use the Declara­
tion as a legal source. Agranat insisted that, since the Declaration 
expressed '"the vision of the people and its faith,' we are bound to 
pay attention to the matters set forth in it, when we come to inter­
pret [the] laws of the State."31 In short, Kol Ha-am, without openly 
challenging the supremacy of the legislature, did exactly what Hand 
had done in Masses: read into the interpretation of laws the basic 
presuppositions of a democratic deliberative society. Lahav views 
the case as a major, first step in making the Israeli judiciary the 
guardian of individual rights and characterizes this aspect of 
27. 244 F. at 540. 
28. 244 F. at 540. 
29. Although Agranat was familiar with, and often drew upon, the work of American 
judges and scholars, see generally Lahav, supra note 16, and indeed sometimes quoted Hand, 
there is no evidence that he knew of the Masses case. 
30. Masses, 244 F. at 540. 
31. Kol Ha·am, supra note 16, at 105. The Declaration stated, inter alia, that the State of 
Israel "will be based on freedom, justice and peace" and "will guarantee freedom of religion, 
conscience, language, education and culture." Declaration of the Establishment of the State 
of Israel, 1 l.S.I. 3, 4 (1948). 
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Agranat's opinion as "a bold leap" that possessed "radical poten­
tial" (p. 111). 
It is that strikingly parallel methodology of Agranat and Hand, 
that reliance on statutory interpretation imbued by a nation's basic 
norms, that caught my eye. But both Kol Ha-am and Masses had 
significant institutional and constitutional consequences as well. 
Agranat's "bold leap" has provided the basis for his successors' 
considerably greater activism: several of modem Israel's Supreme 
Court Justices have found the Declaration's emphasis that the 
nation is a democratic as well as a Jewish state a very useful spring­
board for judicial interventions that the aging Agranat probably 
would not have endorsed.32 
Hand, too, did not write his parallel Masses opinion as a consti­
tutional one. Yet he clearly hoped - in a rare venture into novel 
constitutional interpretation - that his incitement test would 
become the constitutional standard. In the years immediately fol­
lowing the 1917 Masses ruling, he frequently tried to spread the 
message of Masses, even though the Second Circuit had promptly 
repudiated it. In letters to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and 
Harvard scholar Zechariah Chafee, Jr., in particular, he persisted in 
advancing his approach. But in Schenck v. United States,33 the 
Court adopted the clear and present danger standard, a standard 
Hand considered an inadequate protection of expression. A few 
months after Schenck, the Holmes dissent in Abrams v. United 
States34 placed greater emphasis on the immediacy of the danger 
caused by speech and thus put greater bite into clear and present 
danger. Hand was still not satisfied, but the Supreme Court was not 
inclined to move to an incitement approach. By the early 1920's, 
32. The modem Israeli Supreme Court has impressed me as perhaps the most activist in 
the world, even though (or perhaps because) it still operates without a complete written 
constitution. I first formed that impression in 1994, when I attended a conference which 
included Justices from the German, Canadian, American as well as Israeli Supreme Court. 
See supra note 11. My enhanced attention to the Israeli Supreme Court's work since this first 
visit to Israel has strengthened my impression. For example, the modem Court has "effec­
tively abolish[ed]" standing requirements and "seriously erod[ed] the 'justiciability' (political 
question) doctrine." See Aeyal M. Gross, The Politics of Rights in Israeli Constitutional Law, 
in lsRAEL STUDIES, vol. 3, no. 2 (Pnina Lahav, Guest Editor, Fall 1998), 80, 85. Moreover, 
the Israeli Supreme Court has rendered rulings quite startling to American eyes - e.g., 
ordering the Speaker of the Knesset, Israel's parliament, not to remove a racist bill from the 
Knesset's agenda, H/C 742, Kahana v. Speaker of the Knesset, 39(4) P.D. 85 (1984), and 
ordering the Prime Minister to remove from his Cabinet a minister who had been indicted on 
criminal charges, H/C 3094, Ha-tenua le-maan eichut ha-shilton v. Government of Israel, 
47(5) P.D. 426 (1993). For a recent defense of the Israeli Supreme Court's stance by its Chief 
Justice, see Aharon Barak, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democracy, in ISRAEL STUD· 
IES, supra, at 6; for a critical evaluation of the Court's directions, see Aeyal M. Gross, in 
ISRAEL STUDIES, supra, at 88-92 (on the role of Israel's Basic Laws of 1992 in enhancing the 
Israel Supreme Court's powers) and 97-101 (fearing the "Lochnerization" of Israeli constitu­
tional law). 
33. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
34. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
May 1999] Chief Justice Agranat 2127 
Hand concluded that he had "not much hope that my own views as 
stated in the Masses case would ever be recognized as law."35 
But Hand was wrong. Eight years after he died in 1961, the 
Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio36 adopted Hand's incite­
ment emphasis as a central ingredient of a more speech-protective 
interpretation of the First Amendment. 37 
* * * 
Agranat's greatest legacy to Israeli law was probably uninten­
tional. Recent Chief Justices have led its Supreme Court in turning 
Israel's Declaration of Independence into a tool legitimating the 
judicial crafting of a jurisprudence of rights. As Lahav notes, this 
modem resurrection of Agranat's legacy of the 1950s has "pushed 
its frontiers beyond [his] wildest imagination" (p. 252). Lahav's 
book thus provides sophisticated background for an understanding 
of such contemporary crises as the beleaguered state of the 
Supreme Court itself. Today's Chief Justice, the brilliant Aharon 
Barak, has to operate under military guard and has been labeled 
"an enemy of the Jews."38 Even more recently, the religious leader 
of Israel's ultra-Orthodox Shas Party denounced the Justices as 
"wicked . . .  empty-headed and wanton evildoers" who are "unclean 
and desecrate the Sabbath."39 On February 14, 1999, some 250,000 
ultra-Orthodox Jews participated in demonstrations that attacked 
the "tyranny" of the Supreme Court.40 This controversy is in tum a 
reflection of the ongoing conflict between Orthodox Jews on the 
one hand and non-Orthodox and secular ones on the other. An 
observer might well suspect that the greatest threat to the survival 
of the State of Israel lies in conflicts among Jews rather than in 
35. Letter from Learned Hand to Walter Nelles (April 20, 1923) (quoted in Gunther, 
supra note 20, at 750. Even earlier, Hand had written to Holmes that achieving Supreme 
Court adoption of the Masses approach seemed a hopeless venture: "I bid a long farewell to 
my little toy ship which set out quite bravely on the shortest voyage ever made." Letter from 
Learned Hand to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (Mar. 1919) quoted in Gunther, supra note 20, 
at 739. 
· 
More than three decades after Abrams, Hand, in his Second Circuit opinion in Dennis v. 
United States 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), affd., 341U.S. 494 (1951), applied (and appeared to 
dilute) the clear and present danger test, largely because he felt bound by Supreme Court 
precedents endorsing the Schenck-Abrams standard. See GERALD GUNTIIBR, CONSTITU­
TIONAL LAW 1041 n.3 (12th ed. 1991). Even at the time of Dennis, however, he privately 
thought his Masses standard was preferable. GUNTIIBR, LEARNED HAND, supra note 14, at 
604. 
36. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
37. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTIIBR, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 53 n.1 
(1999). 
38. Joel Greenberg, Major Israeli Writer Leads Protest on Orthodox Rally, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 18, 1999, at Al3. 
39. Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, quoted in Thomas L. Friedman, Synagogue and State, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 23, 1999, at A23. 
40. See id. 
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disputes between Israelis and Palestinians or other peoples of the 
Middle East. 
* * * 
This illustration of the contemporary value of Lahav's fascinat­
ing book comprises only a small part of its contents. Her biography 
touches on virtually every major theme affecting Israel's history, for 
Agranat's long tenure produced rulings involving all of them: the 
tensions between catastrophe Zionism and utopian Zionism (e.g., 
pp. 185-94); the impact of the Holocaust, especially confronted by 
Agranat in the Kaszmer (pp. 121-44) and Eichmann cases (pp. 145-
62); the "Who Is a Jew?" controversy (pp. 196-220). The continuing 
interest of Americans in issues such as these - issues explored by 
Lahav with such rare skill - helps explain the extraordinary rich­
ness of this book. 
This biography is truly a feast. Permit yourself to be nourished 
by it! 
